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I wish I could argue that the world had properly absorbed the lessons of the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Unfortunately, I must argue the opposite. 
Why? First and foremost, large numbers of people around the world believe that 
dropping the atomic bombs—regardless of how catastrophic the consequences were 
for the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—saved lives, perhaps millions of them, 
by bringing World War II to a prompt conclusion. But history doesn't substantiate 
this point of view. Japan had already lost much ground in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Europe's fascist regimes had fallen; the war had ended in Europe, North Africa, and 
the Middle East; and Japan was left to fight its enemies alone. Under such 
circumstances the Japanese Empire couldn't have prolonged the war much longer in 
any case. As Dwight Eisenhower put it, “[T]he Japanese were ready to surrender and 
it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.” 
Second, no one was taken to court as a result of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and this 
has had a profound impact on how the bombings are perceived. German and Japanese 
war criminals faced the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, but a man such as General 
Curtis LeMay—whose air force burned cities from one end of Japan to the other, 
killing hundreds of thousands of civilians even before Hiroshima and Nagasaki—
faced no such justice. "If we'd lost the war," LeMay later said, "we'd all have been 
prosecuted as war criminals." But the United States did not lose the war, and in the 
decades since there hasn't been enough debate about the legality of the bombings. As 
a result, nuclear weapons have gained a certain legitimacy. 
Third, members of the nuclear club—the United States and Russia, for example—
have sometimes issued nuclear threats in order to achieve policy goals. The goals 
have ranged from deterring adversaries' military operations to effecting regime 
change. Unfortunately, threats such as these can convince national leaders that 
preserving their regimes requires establishing a nuclear deterrent—as has been the 
case with North Korea. But then, leaders throughout history have wanted to acquire 
the most powerful weapons of their era. Thus it is difficult to maintain optimism 
about prospects for the nonproliferation regime over the coming decades. 
 
Finally, practitioners of international relations often treat nuclear deterrence as if it 
were indisputable fact. According to a common telling of Cold War history, the 
United States and the Soviet Union were forced by mutual assured destruction and 
one another's second-strike capability to exercise restraint. This prevented crises 
from erupting into dangerous conflicts. But the conditions that prevailed in that era 
were highly peculiar. For example, the most populated areas of the United States and 
Soviet Union were separated by enormous distances. If either side had launched a 
nuclear attack, the other side would have had time to launch a reprisal. This indeed 
made deterrence fairly reliable. What international security analysts often fail to 
recognize is that deterrence is less reliable in a compact region such as the Middle 
East. Also, in that highly volatile region and elsewhere, hatreds between nations are 
sometimes so intense that, if certain leaders had nuclear weapons at their disposal, 
they might have used them already—regardless of the consequences (even to 
themselves). Many people have not internalized the tragedy that befell the Japanese 
people with the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, and likewise they sometimes 
lack empathy for fellow human beings in rival nations. 
The international community has made concerted, elaborate efforts to prevent 
nuclear proliferation. But technology for building nuclear weapons continues to 
spread. The possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist 
organizations with apocalyptic views can by no means be disregarded. I fear that 
seven more decades will not elapse without the wartime detonation of a nuclear 
weapon. 
